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B
anks hold reserves in the form of account balances at the central bank
and vault cash. The average aggregate reserves of depository institu-
tionsintheUnitedStatesduring2005was$46billion. Banksusethese
reserves to settle payments to other banks (and other participants in ﬁnancial
markets) during the day. In 2005, the average daily value of Fedwire fund
transfers—the primary means by which banks transfer funds to one another—
was approximately $2 trillion; that is, nearly 50 times the quantity of reserves.
When reserves do not pay interest overnight, banks face an opportunity cost
from holding reserves overnight. However, if overnight overdrafts resulting
from ending the day with insufﬁcient reserves imply a penalty (in terms of
higher interest rates or other types of penalties), then holding reserves may
also be associated with the beneﬁt of avoiding potential overdrafts. On aver-
age, during 2005 banks held a total of $1.7 billion in excess reserves; that is,
reserves in excess of required reserves (see Table 1).
In September 2006, Congress passed legislation that authorized the Fed-
eral Reserve to pay interest on banks’ reserve balances, beginning in 2011.
The legislation also granted the Board of Governors additional ﬂexibility in
setting reserve requirements for depository institutions after October 1, 2011.
According to this new legislation, the Federal Reserve can pay interest on
all types of balances, including required reserves, supplemental reserves, and
contractualclearingbalances,heldbyorfordepositoryinstitutionsatareserve
bank. Suchinterest, ifauthorizedbytheBoard, maybepaidatleastonceeach
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Table 1 Total Reserves at Depository Institutions (Million $)
Date Total Non-Borrowed Required Excess
Reserves Reserves Reserves Reserves
June 2003 42,025 41,864 39,980 2,046
December 2003 42,949 42,903 41,906 1,043
June 2004 45,720 45,540 43,787 1,933
December 2004 46,848 46,785 44,938 1,909
June 2005 45,950 45,701 44,176 1,774
December 2005 45,406 45,237 43,497 1,909
June 2006 45,067 44,814 43,282 1,785
October 2006 41,756 41,528 40,058 1,698
Notes: Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.3, Table 2, Aggregate Reserves of Deposi-
tory Institutions and the Monetary Base (not adjusted for changes in reserve requirements
and not seasonally adjusted) (http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h3/).
calendar quarter at a rate or rates not to exceed the general level of short-term
interest rates.
This new legislation represents a signiﬁcant change in policy that could
affect the choices that banks make about reserve holdings. And, since most
central banks conduct monetary policy by intervening in the daily market
for banks’reserves, this change could affect the implementation of monetary
policy as well by altering the behavior of the demand for reserves. Since
paying interest reduces the opportunity cost for a bank of being “stuck” with
unusedreservesovernight,banksmaybecomewillingtoholdgreaterreserves.
But the demand for reserves depends not only on this opportunity cost, but
also on the beneﬁt of avoiding the need to borrow to make up for a reserves
shortfall. It is also likely that the demand for reserves depends on the nature
of the payments for which the reserves will be used.
In the settlement of payments during a business day, banks’ reserves are
supplemented by access to intraday credit from the Fed. If one bank seeks
to send funds in excess of its reserve balance through the Fedwire system to
another bank, the sender incurs a daylight overdraft. So reserves and daylight
credit act as a substitute means of funding transfers during the day. The
treatment of reserves overnight, though, can inﬂuence the degree to which
banks rely on daylight credit to cover their daylight payment activity.
The opportunity cost of holding reserves is most directly affected by the
central bank’s interest rate policy. A bank’s willingness to substitute away
from reserves for payment purposes is directly affected by the terms on which
the central bank provides daylight credit. In this article, we are interested in
the link between these terms and the terms on overnight reserves. We provide
a simple model of the demand for reserves by banks (in line with the classic
contribution by Poole 1968) and study the implications of paying interest onH. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 113
reserves on the conduct of monetary policy and the use of daylight credit by
banks.
One important public policy dimension with regard to daylight credit is
absent from our model. Speciﬁcally, the model abstracts from credit risk
incurred by the central bank. When banks settle payments by drawing on
central bank credit, the result is to shift credit risk exposure from private
counterparties to the central bank. Central banks have a number of tools
availableformanagingthisexposure, fromthepricingofdaylightcredittothe
impositionofcreditcapsorcollateralrequirements. Toaddresstheseandother
public policy questions adequately would require a more complete, general
equilibriummodel. Themodelweexamineismeanttoisolatesomekeyforces
that we think would be at work in the joint determination of the demand
for reserves and for daylight credit in a reasonable, more general, model.
Understanding the forces driving daylight credit is important because of the
potential for overuse of underpriced central bank credit and the associated
misallocation of risk.
Before presenting the model, we discuss in Section 1 some basic obser-
vations about reserves, payments, and credit in the Fed’s large-value payment
system. Section 2 introduces the basic model of banks’ demand for reserves
andthedeterminationoftheequilibriuminterestrateinthemarketforreserves.
Banks’demand for reserves in our model is purely voluntary. No reserve re-
quirements are assumed. The reason banks hold reserves in our model is
because reserves are useful for making payments. The alternative assets, in
our case bonds, have a positive overnight rate of return premium but cannot
be used to make payments. If the bank does not have enough reserves to settle
its payments, it has to resort to central bank credit. Overnight overdrafts, in
particular, are subject to a penalty rate that banks want to avoid paying. In
other words, banks hold reserves to limit their exposure to overdraft penalties.
In Section 3, we introduce the central bank’s ability to pay interest on
unused reserves. We show how interest on reserves allows the central bank
to ﬁx the market interest rate at a target level by “ﬂooding” the market with
reservesandﬁxingtheinterestonreservesatthechosentarget. Thispolicywas
ﬁrst proposed by Goodfriend (2002) and the model provides a formalization
of his argument. The model also allows a precise description of an alternative
approach to paying interest on reserves. In this approach, the central bank
pays a rate at a ﬁxed spread below the target market rate, which, together with
anovernightlendingrateataﬁxedspreadabovethetarget,createsa“corridor”
around the market rate.
Sections 2 and 3 consider the demand for reserves in the absence of a
potential payments-related need for daylight credit. However, as noted by
Lacker (2006) and as suggested by the interdependence discussed above, the
ability of the central bank to pay interest on reserves may have relevant impli-
cations for the daylight credit policy that the central bank may ﬁnd optimal.114 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Section 4, then, extends the model in Sections 2 and 3 to take into consid-
eration the determinants of the daylight credit decisions of banks. We show
how interest on reserves can motivate banks to economize the use of daylight
credit without reducing their access to liquidity during the day.
Our simple model allows us to demonstrate a number of interesting fea-
tures of the mechanics of the markets for reserves. For instance, in a corridor
system, there are circumstances in which a central bank can implement a
change in the target market rate without changing the supply of reserves, sim-
ply by moving its lending rate and its rate on reserves together. But this result
requires that aggregate demand for reserves—which is driven in the model by
aggregate payment requirements—be relatively stable. With greater variabil-
ity in demand, the task of implementing the target rate is simpliﬁed by the
approach proposed by Goodfriend of paying interest at the target rate. When
intraday variation in the timing of payments is added, which creates a poten-
tial demand for daylight credit, eliminating the opportunity cost of holding
reserves by paying interest at the target rate has the added effect of greatly
reducing the demand for daylight credit.
1. U.S. PAYMENTSAND RESERVES
Systems for clearing and settling large-value payments among banks are
oftencategorizedaccordingtotheirapproachtosettlement. Systemsinwhich
payments are settled one-by-one through the transfer of central bank money
throughout the day are typically referred to as real-time gross settlement sys-
tems (RTGS). The alternative is net settlement, in which payments are held
until the end of a settlement period, typically a day, and only net obligations
are actually transferred. Zhou (2000) provides a good introduction to these
differences, and Kahn and Roberds (1999) discuss in detail the comparative
advantages and disadvantages of the alternative systems.
A notable difference between these two alternative ways of organizing
(large-value) payment systems is that a daily net settlement arrangement in-
volves the creation of intraday credit exposures among its members. By con-
trast, in an RTGS system, bilateral obligations are extinguished throughout
the day. Because of possible mismatches in the timing of receipts and pay-
ments during the day, participants in an RTGS system may demand credit to
cover early payments when they are expecting later receipts. In some of these
systems, intraday credit is provided by the central bank.
For the most part, large-value payments in the United States are executed
using one of the two main systems: Fedwire and CHIPS (Clearing House
Interbank Payments System). Fedwire has two subsystems: Fedwire Funds
Transfer and Fedwire Book-Entry Securities. The Fedwire Funds Transfer
systemisareal-timegrosssettlementsystemoffundstransfersacrossFederal
Reserve accounts of participants. The Fedwire Book-Entry Securities systemH. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 115













































Notes:Federal Reserve Board Payment System Risk data. Average daylight overdrafts are
calculated based on a 21.5-hour Fedwire operating day (http://www.federalreserve.gov/
paymentsystems/psr/).




ing House to clear and settle business-to-business transactions. On January
22, 2001, CHIPS converted from an end-of-day, multilateral net settlement
system to one that provides ﬁnal settlement for all payment orders as they are
released. Payment instructions submitted to the queue that remain unsettled
at the end of the day, known as the residual, are tallied on a multilateral net
basis. Banks pre-fund their CHIPS payments with a Fedwire transfer from
their reserve accounts at the Fed at the beginning of the day.
To facilitate the normal ﬂow of payments in the system, the Federal Re-
serve provides daylight credit to depository institutions. In this context, the
FederalReservehasadoptedanexplicitprogramtocontroltheuseofintraday
1A delivery-versus-payment system is a mechanism that ensures that the ﬁnal transfer of one
asset occurs if and only if the ﬁnal transfer of another asset occurs.116 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly


















Average Daily Volume 
(left scale)













































Notes: Federal Reserve Board Fedwire Funds Service quarterly data. The average daily
volume and average daily value of transfers are based on the number of business days
in each period (http://www.federalreserve.gov/paymentsystems/fedwire/).
credit, the Payments System Risk (PSR) policy (Coleman [2002] provides a
good introduction to the evolution of the PSR policy of the Fed). The two
main instruments of the PSR policy are the imposition of net debit caps and
interest rate fees on daylight overdrafts. The objective is to limit excessive
use of daylight credit and, therefore, reduce the Fed’s exposure to credit risk.
In1985,theFedintroducednetdebitcapsfortheﬁrsttime. Netdebitcaps
limitthemaximumdaylightoverdraftpositionthatadepositoryinstitutioncan
incur in its Federal Reserve account. These debit caps did not have a great
inﬂuence on the expansion of daylight credit that was taking place at the time,
and,in1994,theFederalReservestartedimposingaminute-by-minuteinterest
charge on the average daylight overdraft that each institution incurred during
the business day.
Figure 1 shows the large drop on average daylight overdraft after that
change in policy.2 (For a careful statistical analysis of the effect of caps and
2 Most of the reduction in daylight overdrafts after the change in policy in 1994 was due to
a reduction in securities-related overdrafts. Charging fees provided a strong incentive for securitiesH. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 117
Figure 3 Average Daylight Overdraft as a Percentage ofAverage Daily




































Notes: Federal Reserve Board data (see Figures 1 and 2). Average daylight overdrafts are
calculated based on a 21.5-hour Fedwire operating day (http://www.federalreserve.gov/
paymentsystems/psr/).
fees on the level of daylight overdrafts in the United States, see Hancock and
Wilcox 1996. See also Mills and Nesmith 2006.) It is important to note,
however, that the number and value of Fedwire transactions has been trending
upwards during this period (see Figure 2) and that, in fact, the value of the
average daylight overdraft, as a percentage of the value of total transactions
over Fedwire, has remained relatively stable at around 1.8 to 2.0 percent for
the last ten years, displaying perhaps a slight upward trend (see Figure 3).
Theneedforcreditinthepaymentsystemisdeterminedbybanks’holdings
ofreserves. Thereservepositionsofbanksare,inturn,determinedbyanarray
of factors, including legal reserve requirements and the price of borrowing
reserves,eitheronthefederalfundsmarketorfromtheFed’sdiscountwindow.
dealers to adopt practices that reduced the use of intraday credit; in particular, they substantially
revised their repo settlement practices. Net debit caps were reduced by 25 percent in early 1988
and daylight credit initially fell (approximately 5.5 percent) but then continued growing at an
accelerated pace until 1994, as seen in Figure 1. The data on peak daylight credit present a
similar pattern to that for average daylight credit presented here.118 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Desired reserves could also depend on the cost of borrowing from the Fed
within the day. For a given level of payment activity, daylight overdrafts
will typically decrease as reserve holdings of banks increase. The model in
the next section provides a ﬁrst step in formalizing some of the relationships
among payments, demand for reserves, and interest rates, which are essential
for understanding how modern payment systems function.
2. A SIMPLE MODEL
We start our analysis with a very simple model that allows us to capture some
of the tradeoff faced by banks in their management of reserves. In fact, in the
next two sections we abstract from issues related to daylight credit and keep
the model and analysis as simple as possible. These sections provide a good
introduction to the main forces driving the determination of the interest rate in
the market for reserves. Later, in Section 4, we extend the model in a natural
way and discuss the connection among daylight credit, reserve management
by banks, and the market interest rate.
We start our study of the simple model by ﬁrst describing the decision
problem faced by a typical bank. The solution to this problem delivers the
demand for reserves for each individual bank (Poole 1968). After that, we
consider the situation in which there are many banks and aggregate their
demands to obtain the demand for reserves in the market. Finally, we study
the determination of interest rate as a result of a standard equalization of
(aggregate) demand and supply.
The Bank’s Problem
Let us start with a simpliﬁed setup. Suppose the bank has a given amount of
funds, F, that will be used to execute some payments for the same amount.
While the the total amount of payments, F, is known with certainty, payments
can happen at the end of the day or next morning. The bank can decide to
hold these funds in either of two possible assets, reserves (R) or bonds (B).
That is, we have that
F = R + B.
Let P be the payment that the bank has to make at the end of the day.
The next-morning payment will then be equal to F − P. Suppose that bonds
cannot be used to settle payments, and the bank must decide the allocation of
funds between reserves and bonds before knowing the exact amount P. Also,
for simplicity, assume that payments today are only credited in the recipient’s
account the next day; that is, the bank does not expect to receive new funds
that would increase its end-of-day balances. Then, if the amount of reservesH. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 119
R held by the bank is lower than the required end-of-day payment P, the bank
incurs an overnight overdraft for the value P − R.3
For concreteness, assume that the size of the end-of-day payment P is




. The assumption about the dis-
tribution of P is just for the sake of simplicity; it implies that the size of the
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serving any particular one of these values being the same. More importantly,











Let r be the (overnight) rate of return on bonds and ro the interest rate on
overnight overdrafts. We consider the case where the overnight overdraft rate
implies a penalty; that is, ro >r . Reserves give no return but can be used to
cover part (or all) of the payment P. Throughout this article we assume that
F>P.
The overnight expected return for the bank, denoted by  , is then
given by
  = [1 − p(R)]
 
rB − ro (ER+P − R)
 
+ p(R)rB.
The ﬁrst term tells us that, with probability 1−p(R),the bank needs to make
an end-of-day payment P greater than R and, hence, the bank has to incur an
overdraft. The expected overdraft is given by the amount ER+P − R. With
probability p(R),the payment P is smaller than the total reserves held by the
bank and the bank just gets the normal return on its bond holdings r,B.
Rearranging the expression for the bank’s return we have that
  = rB − [1 − p(R)]ro (ER+P − R).
Using the equation F = B +R and substituting the expression for ER+P and
p(R), we can rewrite the expression for   as












which again can be rewritten as










3Alternatively, we could interpret P as the value of the required payments net of any new
balances arriving late in the day. Our simplistic assumption about turnover of reserve ﬂows
facilitates the analysis of equilibrium but is not essential for the results. However, within-the-
day turnover brings about a number of other interesting issues that we do not discuss in this
article (see Beyeler et al. 2006 for a careful study regarding this issue).120 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
The bank will choose its level of reserves, R, to maximize its overnight ex-
pected return  . Then, when ro >r>0, the demand for reserves by the





This expression tells us that, when the interest rate on bonds, r, increases, the
bank will lower the amount of reserves held (the opportunity cost of holding
reserves is higher). Also, as the size of the possible payments increases (that
is, as P increases), ceteris paribus, the bank will choose to hold higher levels
ofreserves(reservesaremorelikelytobeusefulinavoidingoverdrafts). Itisa
little less obvious to see, yet still true, that if the value of the overdraft interest
rate, ro, increases, the optimal level of reserves, R,∗ also increases. Finally,
notice that for r ≥ ro the bank will demand zero reserves and for r = 0 the
bank will hold any amount of reserves between P and F.
We have assumed that the total amount of funds held by the bank is ﬁxed,
and equal to F.4 Under this assumption, equation (1) has an alternative in-
terpretation. The equation tells us that the penalty premium on overnight
overdrafts, given by ro−r, determines the composition of the bank’s portfolio
between bonds and reserves. Reserves are held to avoid paying the penalty
premium. However, reserves do not gain interest overnight. Hence, hold-
ing reserves also has an opportunity cost. The bank balances these costs and
beneﬁts to determine the optimal composition of its portfolio. In this sim-
ple model, the only reason for banks to hold reserves is to avoid paying the
overnightpenaltyrate. Ifro = r, thentherearenobeneﬁtsofholdingreserves
(while there is still an opportunity cost), and the proportion of funds held as
reserves is zero.
The Market for Reserves
Normally, there are many banks interacting in the market and deciding their
optimal level of reserves.5 In principle, we can aggregate all their demands







0i f r ≥ ro
(ro−r)




if r = 0.
4 Then, in fact, we could normalize F to unity, in which case R and B could be interpreted
as the proportion of funds held in reserves and bonds, respectively.
5 See Bartolini et al. (2005) for a more detailed discussion of the overnight federal funds
market in the United States where over 7,500 institutions with accounts at the Federal Reserve
borrow and lend reserve balances on an uncollateralized basis.H. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 121
Note that ro and r are market prices common to all banks, but the distribution
of likely end-of-day payments may differ across banks, and hence P i may
differ across banks.
For simplicity we will assume that there is a large number (a continuum)
of banks (with mass equal to one). Then, when ro >r>0 the total demand









where EP is the average value (across banks) of the maximum possible
required payment. Note that in our simple model, the expected payment
requirement for bank i is given by P i/2 and the average across banks is then
equal to EP/2. Hence, the variable EP characterizes the level of payment
requirements in the economy.
Let us also assume that, each day, the aggregate volume of end-of-day
payments can be in either of two possible states, high or low.6 In other words,
some days the required payments (on average) tend to be high, and some days
they tend to be low. We capture this idea by allowing EP to take two possible
values, EP H andEP L, withEP H >E P L andtheprobabilityofEP H equal
θ (hence, the probability of EP L equals 1 − θ).
Here, for simplicity, we assume that banks know the level of aggregate
requiredpaymentsbeforechoosingtheirdemandforreserves. Note,then,that
for a given value of ro, the aggregate demand for reserves is a function of the
interest rate r and the level of required payments indexed by EP j. Then, we
can write Rd
j(r) ≡ Rd(r;EP j) with j being equal to H and L.
By buying and selling bonds in exchange for reserves, the central bank
controls the relative supply of reserves available in the system. Given a value
of the supply of reserves, Rs, there exists an interest rate r∗ that clears the




j) = Rs, (2)
with j = H,L. Figure 4 provides a graphic representation of this market-
clearing condition.
Equation (2) deﬁnes an implicit function r∗
j(Rs) for the market-clearing
interest rate given a supply of reserves, Rs. In particular, if Rs ∈ (0,EP L)
6 One possible interpretation of the ﬂuctuations in the aggregate (net) volume of payments
by banks is that the ﬂuctuations originate in ﬂows between the government and the banking sys-
tem. Dotsey (1991) and Guthrie and Wright (2000) take this interpretation in their study of New
Zealand’s system. See also Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2002) for a study of the U.S. system
that uses a similar interpretation.122 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly





























Then, a higher supply of reserves, Rs, implies a lower market interest rate.
Also, it is easy to see that (for a given Rs) the market interest rates satisfy
r∗
H >r ∗
L. In other words, if the central bank were to ﬁx the supply of reserves,
Rs, the interest rate would be higher in periods of high payment requirements
and lower in periods of low payment requirements.
We can also think of this relationship between the market interest rate and
the supply of reserves in a slightly different way. Suppose that the central
bank wants the interest rate to be equal to some target level rT. Then, there is













EP L = Rs
L;
that is, to maintain a given target interest rate, the central bank has to provide
a higher supply of reserves in periods of high payment requirements.H. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 123
Now, suppose that the central bank has a target interest rate but, for some
reason,hastodecidethesupplyofreservesbeforeknowingwhetherthelevelof
payment requirements in the banking system will be high or low. In principle,
the central bank will try to predict the level of demand for reserves. However,
the predictions may not be perfect. In this case, a possible strategy the central
bankcouldfollowistoﬁxthesupplyofreservessuchthattheaverageinterest
rate equals the target rate. The market rate, then, will ﬂuctuate around the
target rate, being higher than the target rate in periods of high demand (that
is, when EP = EP H) and lower than the target rate during period of low
demand (that is, when EP = EP L).
To see this in the model, notice that the central bank would choose the
supply of reserves RsT such that
θr∗
H(Rs
T) + (1 − θ)r∗
L(Rs
T) = rT. (TC)
To simplify the exposition, let us deﬁne the variable ηj ≡ 1/EP j and con-
centrate our attention on the case where r∗
j is lower than ro and positive for
both j = H and j = L.7 Then, using expression (3) we have that the average
interest rate can be rewritten as follows:
θr∗
H(Rs





























which tells us that to implement a higher average (target) rate the central bank
will need to provide a lower supply of reserves. Note that ηH ≤ η ≤ ηL
and that η is a decreasing function of θ. This property of η, in turn, implies
that when the probability of a high demand for reserves increases, the central
bank, to target the same average rate of interest, will need to supply a higher









Using the expression for Rs
T we have that
r∗






which implies that r∗
H ≥ rT (since η ≥ ηH), r∗




7 While the other possible cases are similar, they are less interesting.124 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
rate will be higher than the target rate in periods of high demand and lower
than the target rate during periods of low demand.
3. INTEREST ON RESERVES
In the previous section, we considered the case in which reserves held by
banks and not used in payments yielded no interest overnight. In general,
banks hold reserves as balances in an account at the central bank, and in
principle the central bank could pay interest on those unused reserves. We
consider this possibility in this section.
There are different ways the central bank can pay interest on reserves.
Here we concentrate on one possible scheme that has been discussed in policy
circles (see Lacker 2006). Under this scheme, the central bank automatically
pays interest overnight on all unused reserves held by banks at the end of
the day after all payments have been executed. We call this scheme a sweep
facility.
Overnight Sweep of Reserves
Supposeunusedreservesare“swept”overnightintobondsthatpayaninterest
rate rs. Then, banks obtain a return of rs on the amount R −P, whenever this
difference is positive. In this case, the overnight expected return for the bank
is given by













where ER+P is the expected value of P conditional on being greater than R,
and ER−P is the expected value of P conditional on being smaller than R.
Here, it is important to note that if R ≥ P then p(R) = 1,E R+P = 0, and
ER−P = P/2. After some manipulations, the expression for  (R) can be
rewritten as
 (R) = rF − r
P
2









The second term in this expression (−rP/2) is the average forgone interest
from making the required end-of-day payment. The third term is the cost of
coveringthehighendofthedistributionofpaymentswithovernightoverdrafts,
andthefourthtermisthe(potential)netbeneﬁtofgettingthesweepinterestrate
on unused reserves (on the low end of the distribution of required payments).
Recall that F ≥ P. Then, if rs >r, it is clear that the bank would choose
the level of R to equal F; that is, the bank would maintain all its funds in theH. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 125
form of reserves. To see this, note that, for all R ≥ P the overnight expected
return is given by
 (R | R ≥ P)= rF − r
P
2







and when rs >rwe ﬁnd that   ( F)>  ( R )for all R ≤ F and, hence,  (R)
is maximized at R = F.8 It is not hard to see that even if rs = r we still
ﬁnd that  (F) ≥  (R) for all R ≤ F. However, as long as R is greater
than P, the bank is indifferent over the composition of its portfolio; that is,
the bank makes the same return independent of how much of its funds are
held in reserves (as long as they are enough to cover all possible end-of-day
payments).





where R∗ is the (interior) value of R that maximized  .9 Note that, since in
this case rs <r ,we ﬁnd that R∗ < P and, for some high possible realizations
of the size of the payment P,the bank will not have enough reserves and will
take an overnight loan at the penalty rate ro.
The demand for reserves of an individual bank is then given by
R∗ =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0i f r ≥ ro
(ro−r)




if r = rs
F if r<r s.
The Market for Reserves Under Sweeps
Using the demand function for individual banks, we can aggregate across
banks and obtain the market demand for reserves under a sweep system. Fol-
lowing the aggregation procedures used before, we ﬁnd that
Rd =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
0i f r ≥ ro
(ro−r)




if r = rs
F if r<r s.
8 Here we are not allowing the bank to hold a negative position on bonds. If banks could
short-sell bonds then rs would be the effective “ﬂoor” of the market interest rate. None of our
results depend on this assumption.
9 See Whitesell (2006) for a similar analysis that would correspond to the case when P has
a normal distribution. Also, Dotsey (1991) and Guthrie and Wright (2000) use versions of this
theory to explain monetary policy implementation by the Reserve Bank of New Zealand.126 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
As long as the supply of bonds is positive, the equilibrium interest rate r∗
cannot be lower than rs. The reason for this result is that if r∗ <r s then all
bankswillwanttoholdalltheirfundsasreserves. Inthiscase, thedemandfor
bonds in the market is equal to zero and the market for bonds does not clear
(since the supply was positive). Figure 5 illustrates the determination of the
market-clearing interest rate under a sweeps system. Note that if the supply
of reserves by the central bank Rs is greater than EP and less than F, then
the market-clearing interest rate r∗ equals rs.
Two important insights, useful in understanding monetary policy imple-
mentation, result from studying the determination of interest rates in a market
inwhichbankshaveavailableasweepfacilitythatallowsthemtoearninterest
on reserves. The ﬁrst insight is related to the role of the net supply of reserves
in a so-called “corridor” system (see Guthrie and Wright 2000 and Whitesell
2006 for recent, more thorough discussions of corridor systems).10 The sec-
ond insight, discussed extensively by Goodfriend (2002) (see also Woodford
2000), is related to the advantages of “ﬂooding” the market with reserves as a
means of targeting a speciﬁc market interest rate.
In fact, the corridor and Goodfriend systems have been regarded as two
alternative schemes for the implementation of interest rate policy. Next, we
provide a brief introduction to these systems in the context of our model.
While abstracting from many important issues, we believe that the discussion
that follows can be helpful in understanding the relative advantages of each
of the systems.
The Corridor System
For simplicity, let us concentrate on the case where EP is constant. Suppose
that the monetary authority wishes to target a given rate rT. One alternative
is to use a corridor system, in which the overnight overdraft and sweep rates
are set as follows:
ro = rT +
δ
2




We will call δ the size of the corridor. Then, by setting the supply of reserves
equal to EP/2, the monetary authority can drive the market interest rate r∗ to
equal the target rate rT.11 What is most interesting about this system is that,
to the extent that the value of EP is fairly stable, the monetary authority can
drive the market rate to any target it wishes, just by changing proportionally
the rates ro and rs (or, in other words, given the size of the corridor, by
10 See also Berentsen and Monnet (2006) for a general equilibrium analysis of a corridor
system.
11 To see this, substitute the formula for the demand of reserves (the case when ro >r>r s)
in the equation Rd = Rs = EP/2.H. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 127






















changing the target rate rT), without changing (in any signiﬁcant way) the
supply of reserves. In fact, the market rate will jump to the new target just as
a consequence of its announcement.
Figure 5 illustrates this case. If the monetary authority intends to increase
the target rate from rT to r 
T, then it only needs to increase proportionally
the rates ro and rs (to r 
o and r 
s, respectively). The demand for reserves, as
a result, will shift upward (in a parallel manner) and even if the supply of
reserves remains unchanged (at the EP/2 level) the market will clear at the
higher, desired rate r 
T.
Alternatively, the corridor may be centered at the market interest rate (and
not the target rate).12 In such a case, Guthrie and Wright (2000) explain
how the central bank can still use announcements to inﬂuence the overnight
market interest rate without the need for explicit open market operations.
Their explanation uses an arbitrage argument based on the expectations hypo-
thesis of the term structure of interest rates. The key element in Guthrie and
Wright’stheoryistheabilityofthecentralbanktouseopenmarketoperations,
if necessary, to inﬂuence the overnight rates in the future. They call their
12 Recall that, for example, when demand is stochastic, the market rate can be different from
the target rate.128 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
Figure 6 The Goodfriend System

















ConsidernowthecasewhereEP cantaketwovalues,EP H >E P L,asinthe
second part of Section 2. Then, the central bank can make the market interest
rate always equal to a given target rate rT by ﬁxing the sweep rate rs = rT and
supplying Rs >E P j for j = H,L (see Figure 6). Clearly, the forecasting
process required to assure that Rs >E P j for j = H,Lis much simpler than
the one that requires forecasting the exact values of EP j for j = H,L.
The Goodfriend system requires that banks hold large amounts of re-
serves, which may result in large interest payments associated with the sweep
facility.13 The corridor system is less subject to this qualiﬁcation, but when
the payment requirements by banks ﬂuctuate (as represented by ﬂuctuations
in EP in the model), the interest rate will be harder to target precisely. An
13 See Goodfriend (2002, Section IV) for a careful discussion of these issues. Paying interest
on reserves tends to encourage banks to substitute reserves for bond holdings in their balance
sheet. Goodfriend discusses how the central bank could exploit the yield curve to ﬁnance interest
on reserves by increasing its holdings of longer-term bonds (which, in principle, will result from
the initial exchange of bonds for reserves when banks increase their demand for the latter).H. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 129
exhaustive discussion of the pros and cons of corridor systems is beyond the
scope of this article. Whitesell (2006) provides some interesting perspective
on these issues. Here, it is sufﬁcient to note that even when EP ﬂuctuates,
if the ﬂuctuations are not very signiﬁcant, a corridor system still allows the
central bank to change the (average) target rate (by announcement) without
major revisions to the supply of reserves.
4. DAYLIGHT CREDIT
The previous section dealt with the decision of banks, which, as the end of
the day approaches, do not want to ﬁnd themselves holding unused reserves
that will earn zero interest overnight. To discuss the issue of daylight credit
and how it relates to the end-of-day decisions, we need to extend the model to
includesomedaytimedecisions. However,theanalysisintheprevioussection
will constitute an integral part of the analysis in this more complicated case.
The Bank’s Problem
We start the analysis, again, by studying the decisions of an individual bank.
Relativetothebank’sproblemintheprevioussection,weaddanextradecision
thatwillallowustocapturesomeofthetradeoffsfacedbythebankduringthe
day. In particular, we will consider the situation in which the bank expects to
maketwopaymentsbeforethenight. WewilldenotebyP E theearlypayment






The bank starts the day with a given amount of funds F, with F ≥ 2P.
These funds are allocated to holdings of bonds B1 and reserves R1. The bank
observesthevalueofP E andisrequiredtosettlethispayment(real-timegross
settlement). If P E >R 1, then the bank needs to obtain daylight credit. Let
re be the daylight credit interest rate. After that, with probability q,the bank
ﬁnds a counterparty to trade bonds for reserves and adjust the composition of
its portfolio. Later, with potentially an adjusted portfolio, the bank faces the
arrivalofasecondpaymentP L andisrequiredtosettlethatpayment. Nonew
trading opportunities (or chances to adjust the portfolio) exist after the second
payment. The left-over (positive or negative) balances are carried overnight.
First, we consider the case in which unused reserves earn no interest (and
no sweep service is in place). To solve the problem of the bank, we start by
studying the decision of the bank in the later part of the day when it ﬁnds












−rR2 − [1 − p(R2)]ro
 
ER2+P L − R2
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whereR2 istheamountofreserveschosenbythebankintherebalancingstage
(after ﬁnding the counterparty). The maximization problem in the expression
for  ∗
2 is the same as the one studied in the previous section and describes the
quantity of reserves the bank would like to carry to fulﬁll the late payment P L
(before knowing the exact value of that payment).
We are now ready to describe the decision problem of the bank choosing
daylight reserves R1. The ﬁnal return of the bank will depend on the value of
the early payment P E and the late payment P L, relative to the chosen value
of reserves R1. The bank does not know the value of the required payments at
the time of choosing R1 so the value of P E may turn out to be lower or greater
than R1. In fact, under some values of the interest rates r and ro, the optimal
value of R1 may be larger than P, in which case the bank always has enough
reserves to cover the early payments P E (and no daylight credit is used).
For given values of P E and R1, we describe in theAppendix the expected
payoff to a bank that does not get to rebalance its portfolio after its early




. The total expected payoff to
the bank also involves the payoffs when it can rebalance its portfolio and the
charges from using daylight credit, if there is any. Explicitly, if P E is greater














where the second term represents the interest paid on daylight credit.
If P E is lower than R1, then the bank’s total return after making the early














Here, since P E <R 1, the bank does not need daylight credit and the interest
rate re does not appear in the expression.
ThebankwillchoosedaylightreservesR1 tomaximizetheexpectedvalue
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P if 0.5ro >r>0,
14 It is worth mentioning that to perform these computations one needs to take into account
that, for some interest rates, the optimal amount of reserves R1 would be greater than P. In such
case, the bank will not require daylight credit regardless of its realization of PE.H. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 131
where c = (1 − q)(ro − r)+ re. Note that R∗
1 is equal to P and continuous
in r at r = 0.5ro. If r = 0 then the bank is indifferent between holding any





Note ﬁrst that given all other values of the relevant variables, increases in
thevalueofthemarketinterestrater decreasethevalueofR∗
1. Inotherwords,
the demand for reserves of an individual bank is a decreasing function of the
interest rate, as in the previous sections. Similarly, the demand for reserves is
an increasing function of the size of the highest possible payment P.
It is also not hard to show that if r ∈ (0.5ro,r o), then R∗
1 is an increasing
function of re. That is, when the interest rate on daylight overdrafts increases,
the bank holds more reserves. When r ∈ (0,0.5ro), the demand for reserves
doesnotdependontheinterestrateondaylightcreditbecausethebankchooses
a level of reserves R∗
1 > P and never incurs a daylight overdraft.
The last comparative statics that we consider is with respect to the prob-
ability of being able to rebalance the portfolio after the early payment, that
is, the probability q. In this model the optimal amount of reserves, as long
as it is smaller than P, is increasing in q. The reason for this result is that
the probability of holding unused reserves overnight increases as q decreases
(this is because rebalancing is not possible and the value of both payments
P E and P L may happen to be low). For a high opportunity cost of holding
unused reserves (that is, for high values of r), the bank will lower reserves if
these are more likely to become excess overnight reserves.













Clearly, this quantity decreases when R1 increases. In this model then, an
increase in the interest rate on daylight credit tends to increase the level of
reserves and, hence, decrease the average daylight credit incurred by banks.
The Market for Reserves
The overnight interest rate on bonds, r, will result from the interactions late in
thedaybetweenbanksthatgettorebalancetheirportfolioandthecentralbank.
Thedemandforreservesearlyinthedayresultsfromtheanticipationbybanks
of the value that the interest rate will take in these late-in-the-day interactions.
This is the case since what matters to banks is the opportunity cost of holding
15 Note that when r = ro, we have that R∗
1 is positive. Hence, in contrast with the analysis
in the previous section, in this case r could potentially be greater than ro and the demand for
reserves still be positive. Recall that reserves now also allow the bank to economize in daylight
credit. We do not study the (unusual) case of r>r o here.132 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
reserves given by the overnight interest rate on bonds, r. In our model, banks
canperfectlypredictthisinterestrate, r. Clearly, thisresultisasimpliﬁcation.
Inreality,theovernightinterestratetendstoﬂuctuateduringtheday(although
such ﬂuctuations are not very signiﬁcant in the United States). Bartolini et
al.(2005) extensively document the behavior of the overnight interest rate
in the U.S. federal funds market and provide interesting discussions of the
reasons for the observed interest rate ﬂuctuations.16
In our model, only a proportion q of the banks are active late in the day.







Given the supply of reserves, Rs
2, provided by the central bank (also, late in




early payments during the day do not become available as new reserves for
the recipient until the next day. Also, in most cases, the central bank does not
intervene in the bond market late in the day. Assuming that it does intervene,
as we do in this article, simpliﬁes the exposition but is not essential for the
argument. Insummary,theseextremeassumptionsarejustsimpliﬁcationsthat
keep the market-clearing conditions easy to manipulate. There are, of course,
alternative ways of setting up the market-clearing condition that would result
in similar conclusions.
Note that the demand for reserves obtained in this way will behave simi-
larlytothedemandobtainedinSections2and3. Then,itiseasytodemonstrate
that, for large enough values of Rs
2, the market interest rate r∗ will be lower
than 0.5ro and, hence, there will be no demand for daylight credit. How-
ever, as in the previous section, if the demand for reserves is not perfectly
predictable, some ﬂuctuations in the market interest rate will persist. Also,
the market interest rate that implies no demand for daylight credit may be too
low, relative to some speciﬁc target that the central bank may have in mind.
In the rest of this section, we demonstrate that a sweep facility that amounts
to paying interest on reserves can resolve these two potential shortcomings.
Overnight Sweeps and Daylight Credit
Suppose the central bank automatically sweeps overnight all unused reserves
held by banks into bonds that pay a return rs, which is also ﬁxed by the central
16 Many of the key elements in Bartolini et al. (2005) discussions are captured in our model
in a stylized and easy-to-study manner (for example, the inability by banks to perfectly predict
their payment needs late in the day and the risk of overdraft faced by banks that might not be
able to ﬁnd a lender before the market closes). We abstract from studying within-the-day interest
rate ﬂuctuations but believe that our model, after some minor modiﬁcations, could be used as a
ﬁrst step in a formal study of these issues.H. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 133
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P if r<0.5(ro + rs),
where again c = (1 − q)(ro − r) + re. Here, if r = rs then the bank is





Note that, not surprisingly, the demand for reserves under a system with no
sweeps is the same as the one in a system where the interest on sweeps, rs,i s
set to equal zero.
Forr ≥ rs thedemandisdecreasinginr andcontinuous(and,inparticular,
when r = 0.5(ro + rs) the demand for reserves R∗
1 is equal to P). Hence,
when the interest rate r is smaller than 0.5(ro + rs), the bank holds enough
reservestoneverrequiredaylightcredit(sinceP E <R 1 forallpossiblevalues
of P E).
If the central bank wishes to set the market interest rate at a given target
level rT, and simultaneously drive the use of daylight credit to zero, then an
effective mechanism is to set rs = rT <r o and supply enough reserves to
maker = rs. ThisisbasicallythesameGoodfriendideathatweexplainedfor
the simpler model with only one payment per period (see Figure 6). Here, the
Goodfriend system has the added (potential) beneﬁt of signiﬁcantly reducing
the demand for daylight credit by banks.
5. DISCUSSIONAND EXTENSIONS




policy questions in this general subject. Finally, we provide some discussion
of a few other assumptions that are associated with important issues related to
the workings of the market for reserves. In all the cases, we make an explicit
effort to provide adequate references to the relevant literature that extend the
analysis in this article.
Reserve Requirements
Ourmodelofthedemandforreservesbybanksdoesnotrelyontheimposition
ofreserverequirements. However,reserverequirementsareacommonfeature134 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
of many payment systems and, in particular, of the U.S. system. A thorough
discussionofthefunctioningofthemarketforreserveswhentherearereserve
requirements is beyond the scope of this article. Here, we only present a short
introductiontotheissuethatexploitsthesimplicityofourmodel(seeWhitesell
2000 and Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati 2002 for more comprehensive, related
studies).
LetusgobacktothesimplersetupofSection3andsupposethatthecentral
bank imposes a minimum reserve requirement equal to R. Also assume that
banks that cannot satisfy the reserve requirement have to pay the overnight
overdraft rate ro per units of reserve deﬁciency (i.e., borrowed reserves).17 In
such a case, the demand for reserves would take the form in Figure 7. Clearly,
if the supply of reserves is lower than R then banks would only agree to hold
bonds if the rate of return for holding bonds, r, is greater than or equal to ro.
In fact, if r is greater than ro then it is better to hold only bonds and pay the
penalty rate ro to obtain borrowed reserves that cover the reserve requirement.
Some of the return from the interest payments accrued on bonds can later be
used to cover the interest on borrowed reserves.
Hence, if both bonds and reserves are to be held in equilibrium the market
interest rate, r, must equal ro when the supply of reserves is lower than R.I f
thesupplyofreservesisgreaterthanR thentheanalysisissimilartotheonein
Section 2, where banks choose their balance to cover the reserve requirement
and the expected late payment P.
In reality, banks could face some uncertainty about the value of R since it
dependsontheirholdingofdepositssubjecttoreserverequirement, avariable
that is not fully predictable at all times. In the United States, the system is set
up so as to minimize this uncertainty. Banks have to satisfy an average level
ofreservesoverareservemaintenanceperiod, wheretherequiredreservesare
calculated based on the holding of deposits in a previous period. Also, failure
to meet the requirement implies a penalty that is different than the overnight
overdraft rate. While the analysis would be more complicated in this case, the
basic logic described here would still apply.18
Credit Risk
Themodeldoesnotdealwiththeroleofcreditriskindeterminingthebehavior
and outcomes in the payment system. Clearly, paying attention to credit risk
considerations would be essential to reach any deﬁnite policy conclusion. For
17 This is not exactly how deﬁciencies in reserve requirements are treated in the U.S. system,
but this simpler case serves for the purpose of illustration.
18 Whitesell (2000) analyzes a similar model with a two-day reserve requirement maintenance
period and a corridor system. See also Bartolini, Bertola, and Prati (2002) for a model more closely
motivated by the features of the U.S. system.H. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 135











example, credit risk would play a role in explaining why the central bank may
want to economize on bank usage of daylight credit (see Kahn and Roberds
1999 for a description of a model in which credit risk plays a crucial role).
Zhou (2000), following the original contribution by Freeman (1996), shows
that if credit risk is not relevant, then the intraday interest rate re should be
set to equal zero in the optimal policy.19 The model in this article artiﬁcially
abstracts from credit risk and is not designed to provide direct insight into the
optimal determination of the rates ro, re, and rT.20 Rather, it shows how, given
the values for the relevant interest rates, a system of sweeps, which amounts
to paying interest on reserves, can facilitate the implementation of a target
rate rT.
An important feature of the U.S. intraday credit policy that was left out of
the analysis is the imposition of quantitative limits (or “caps”) on the amount
of intraday credit. At any time during the day, each bank should hold intraday
19 This conclusion also depends on the assumption that daylight credit will be exclusively
devoted to payment purposes and cannot be diverted into short-term speculative investment.
20 Optimal policy in payment arrangements is a difﬁcult question (see Zhou 2000, Temzelides
and Williamson 2001, Martin 2004, Mills 2006, and Berentsen and Monnet 2006 for recent con-
tributions). Even the basic question of whether the central bank should play a role in the payment
system does not have a commonly accepted answer among academic economists. Green (1999)
provides a careful study of this important issue.136 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
credit to an amount that does not exceed the bank’s cap.21 In the model, there
is no role for caps. In part, this is a consequence of our explicit abstraction
of any credit risk consideration. To a ﬁrst approximation, caps are imposed
to limit the ability of banks to take large negative positions in their accounts
at the central bank when they are likely to fail. Temzelides and Williamson
(2001)providearelatedjustiﬁcationforcapsinadynamicmodelwithexplicit
informational frictions (see also Koeppl, Monnet, and Temzelides 2004).
Two other instruments that can be used to limit the credit risk exposure
associated with the provision of daylight credit are daylight interest rates and
collateral. Interestratesondaylightcredithaveotherimplications(asidefrom
accounting for credit risk) for the management of reserves by banks. Even
though our model does not take into account credit risk, we have considered
the case of positive daylight credit interest rates to study such alternative
implicationsonbanks’managementofreserves. Lacker(1997)pointsoutthat
interest on daylight credit could reduce the distortion created by not paying
interest on reserves, and in this case ﬁnds that daylight overdraft should be
charged an interest rate at least as high as the market rate.
Collateral, in the form of repos, could certainly be used in the environ-
ment of our model. Recall that total funds, F, are allocated between bonds
and reserves. Since F is greater than P E, the sum of bonds and reserves
is also greater than P E. Therefore, even if payment P E is greater than re-
serves, the bank can always use bonds to collateralize the necessary daylight
credit.22 Since there is no explicit consideration of credit risk in our model,
even though the use of collateral is possible, it is inconsequential (see Martin
2004andMills2006forenvironmentsinwhichcollateralrequirementsplayan
important role).




intraday payments (see also Martin and McAndrews 2006).
Other ImportantAssumptions
In the model, the connection between the payment of interest on reserves and
daylight credit comes from the fact that banks can only adjust their portfolio
21 There is some ﬂexibility implicit in these caps. Basically, banks can exceed the caps
in unusual situations. After repeated violations of the cap, banks can be placed under a strict
system of monitoring and, if necessary, some of their requested payments may be rejected to
avoid overdrafts. See Federal Reserve System (2005) for details.
22 There is no opportunity cost of holding collateral in the model. For a model exploiting
a mechanism similar to this one, but where collateral bears an opportunity cost, see Berentsen and
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during the day with some probability. In other words, banks face a trade
friction in the asset market that limits their ability to adjust their holdings
of reserves. Interestingly, there is a growing amount of literature that aims
at capturing these trading frictions in ﬁnancial markets (see Dufﬁe, Gˆ arleanu,
andPedersen2005,Weill2005,andLagosandRocheteau2006,forexample).
In principle, we can expect that some of the ideas in this article will extend to
environments that more closely follow the new literature on ﬁnancial markets
with (search) frictions.
The model also assumes that the size of payments P E and P L and the
probability of being able to adjust the portfolio after a payment, q, are ex-
ogenous and cannot be modiﬁed by the bank. However, in principle the bank
could inﬂuence the size and timing of payments at some cost. This ﬂexibility
is not present in the model and, if introduced, would highlight the potentially
distortionary effects of certain payment system policies, as for example, not
paying interest on reserves (see Lacker 1997 for a model in which this type
of distortion is possible). Similarly, the efforts to ﬁnd counterparties to trade
and adjust portfolios are also part of an explicit decision by banks facing costs
and beneﬁts that are implied by the system in place. If we change the sys-
tem, for example to evaluate different policies, such decisions by banks may
also change. The model abstracts from this type of so-called “Lucas critique”
effect.
The sizes of P E and P L can be interpreted as proxies for the volume of
payment requirements arriving early and late in the day. These values are
random in the model. Since the size of the payments are random, the bank
cannot perfectly predict them. However, there is no relevant decision in the
model that inﬂuences the values of P E and P L that are likely to be observed.
It is in this sense that we say that P E and P L are exogenous. In the real world,
bankshavesomedegreeofdiscretionregardingthetimingofpaymentsduring
the day. McAndrews and Rajan (2000) discuss some evidence that suggests
that U.S. banks actively synchronize payments to affect payment ﬂows during
theday. Thediscretionoverthetimingofpaymentsopensthedoortostrategic
behavior by banks. A number of articles have formally studied the possibility
of delays and gridlocks in real-time gross settlement systems (see Bech and
Garratt 2003, Martin and McAndrews 2006, Mills and Nesmith 2006, and
Beyeler et al. 2006 for recent contributions).23
23 See Rochet and Tirole (1996) and Freixas and Parigi (1998) for discussions of contagion
and systemic risk in payment systems. Furﬁne (2003) provides an interesting empirical investigation
of interbank exposures in the United States.138 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
6. CONCLUSION
The model in this article is not suitable to analyze the welfare economics of
the topic, as the underlying real economic activity that drives payment needs
(and hence the demands for reserves and daylight credit) is hidden from view
and treated as exogenous. Still, even the partial equilibrium analysis of this
article points to some tentative conclusions. By paying interest on reserves
at less than the market rate of interest, the central bank essentially imposes
a tax on reserves. This tax encourages banks to hold no more reserves than
is necessary to just meet their payment needs. But uncertainty in the timing
of payments means that “just meeting” only happens by accident. Hence, the
desire to hold down reserves leads banks to demand central bank credit. The
provisionofsuchcreditpresentsthecentralbankwithanewsetofchallenges,
from ﬁnding an appropriate price to managing the credit risk exposures that
could result.
In short, like any tax, a tax on reserves creates distortions, including
distortions in the use of daylight credit. Against these, a complete analysis
wouldhavetoconsiderwhatcostsmightbeassociatedwiththegreaterreserve
holdings implied by the Goodfriend system of paying interest at the target
market rate. Our model does not address this issue, but to the extent that such
costs are small, our analysis suggests the optimality of eliminating the tax
on reserves.
In a more general context, Goodfriend (2006) discusses the role of in-
terest on reserves as part of a comprehensive proposal for determining and
implementing an optimal rate of inﬂation in the economy. He argues that the
provisionofcurrencycardaccounts,combinedwiththepaymentofintereston
banks’reserves, would allow the monetary authority to achieve the optimum
quantity of money (as in the Friedman rule) at any inﬂation rate. This would,
in turn, free the monetary authority to set the inﬂation rate at the optimum
level based only on considerations related to the existence of price rigidities
(relativepricedistortionsandmark-ups)andthezero-lower-boundonnominal
interest rates.
This article has emphasized the interdependence of banks’ demand for
daylight credit in the payment system and for overnight reserves. The use
of reserves as the medium of settlement for interbank payments means that
changes in the central bank’s treatment of overnight reserves could also affect
the operation of the intraday, interbank settlement system. If one of the forces
driving the demand for daylight credit has been the desire by banks to avoid
theopportunitycostofholdingsterilereserves, thenreducingthatopportunity
cost by paying interest on reserves should reduce the demand for such credit.
We have considered a simple model that deals with these interdependencies
explicitly and allows us to better understand their origin and consequences.H. M. Ennis and J. A. Weinberg: Reserves and Daylight Credit 139
APPENDIX
Let us denote by π1 the expected payoff to the bank if it does not get a chance
to rebalance its portfolio after the ﬁrst payment, P E. To specify this expected
payoff, there are three relevant ranges of P E that need to be considered. First,
when P E <R 1 − P, the amount of extra reserves R1 left after making the
early payment P E is enough to cover all possible late payments. This can
only happen if R1 > P, of course. In this case, no overnight overdraft will be
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Under a sweep system we need to add to this payoff the expected interest
earned on unused reserves, which is given by
p
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whereE(R1−PE)−P L representstheconditionalexpectationovervaluesofP L
smaller than R1 − P E.
Finally, if R1 < P,then it can happen that P E is greater than R1 and, in
this case, the bank will incur an overnight overdraft equal to the sum of the
daylight credit balance (P E −R1) and the full amount of the second payment









where P/2 represents the average value of PL. In this case, the bank does not
hold any unused reserves and, hence, the payoff is the same under a sweep
system.140 Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond Economic Quarterly
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